












The Zealous Prosecutor as Minister               
of Justice 
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN* 
I met Fred Zacharias for the first time while visiting at Cornell Law 
School in 1983.  We had mutual interests.  We both taught criminal law 
and enjoyed watching college basketball games, especially at the then-
new Carrier Dome in Syracuse, New York.  We talked about teaching, 
and we reminisced about our experiences as former prosecutors.  Fred
was intrigued by my project to write a treatise on prosecutorial ethics
and misconduct.  He did not much care for the title, Prosecutorial 
Misconduct; he thought it should convey a more balanced, less slanted 
approach.  In retrospect, I probably should have taken his suggestion. 
Balanced, thoughtful, imaginative, passionate—those were some of the 
qualities that informed not only Fred’s amazing body of scholarship but 
also, as I came to learn from my somewhat limited perspective, his entire
life. 
As my contribution to this Memorial tribute to Professor Fred 
Zacharias, I have chosen to write about Fred’s 1991 article in the 
Vanderbilt Law Review entitled Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial 
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?1  I have always seen this 
article as a classic, one of the finest and most important discussions of
the special role of the prosecutor in the criminal justice system and of 
the meaning of the prosecutor’s ethical duty to “do justice.”2  This article
is cited repeatedly for numerous points: the conception of the 
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School. 
1. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can 
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991). 






















prosecutor’s duty not to win a case but to see that justice is done, the 
failure of the do-justice ethical standard to effectively regulate the 
behavior of prosecutors, the ability of prosecutors to exploit the gross 
imbalance of power in the adversary system between the prosecution and 
defense and the need to redress that imbalance by establishing clear
ethical guidelines for prosecutors, the articulation of a methodology to
structure prosecutorial trial ethics, and the need for drafters of codes of
professional responsibility to write meaningful rules. 
The settings for Professor Zacharias’s inquiry into the duty to do 
justice are the provisions in the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.3  Well 
before these codes were adopted, as Professor Zacharias points out, this 
“lofty, but undefined” prosecutorial duty4 was most authoritatively 
pronounced in Justice George Sutherland’s famous passage in his 1935 
opinion in Berger v. United States.5  In that case the Court reversed a 
federal conspiracy conviction for pervasive and persistent misconduct by 
the prosecutor.6  And even before Berger’s eloquent pronouncement of 
this ideal, the majestic conception of the prosecutor’s duty to promote
justice was recognized and applauded.  As Professor Bruce Green,
Professor Zacharias’s longtime friend and collaborator, has observed,
courts and commentators in the nineteenth century had described the
prosecutor as a quasi-judicial official whose prodigious powers should 
properly be used for beneficent and not evil purposes.7  And to the extent
that contemporary academic discourse began to focus much more
3. See  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010) (describing 
prosecutors as “minister[s] of justice”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13
(1986) (“[The prosecutor’s] duty is to seek justice . . . .”).
4. See Zacharias, supra note 1, at 47 n.6. 
5. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
6. This passage is cited so often as to become an iconic statement of the role of 
the prosecutor: 
[He] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a 
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation 
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a 
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of 
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.  He may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so.  But, while he may strike hard 
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain 
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to 
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
Id.
7. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 607, 612 (1999) (citing several model rules and commentary, Professor Green 
observes that the concept of a prosecutor’s duty to “seek justice” or “do justice” dates 
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extensively and creatively on the prosecutor’s duty to do justice,8 it is 
abundantly clear that Professor Zacharias’s groundbreaking article was 
not only the catalyst for this doctrinal development but also the most 
authoritative and substantive discussion of the meaning of justice. 
As one of its several objectives, Professor Zacharias’s article 
attempted to clarify the “justice” to which the modern codes refer.  He
suggested two fairly limited prongs: first, that a prosecutor must have a 
good faith belief in the defendant’s guilt and second, that a prosecutor 
must ensure the functioning of the basic elements of the adversary
system.9  However, except for a few continuing responsibilities of a 
prosecutor—refraining from prosecuting unsupported charges, ensuring 
that the accused has an opportunity to exercise procedural rights, and 
making some disclosures of information10—the codes offer no guidance 
on specific obligations that constitute a doing of justice in the setting of 
an adversarial trial.11  To be sure, as Professor Zacharias observes, the
codes are concerned with structuring adversarial practice, and the codes
“do not exempt prosecutors from the requirements of zealous
advocacy.”12 Therefore, as Professor Zacharias suggests, “‘Justice’ must 
have a special interpretation in the context of the adversary system.”13 
8. See, e.g., Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of 
Justice and Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1305 (1996); R. 
Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a 
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty To “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 637 (2006); 
Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn’t Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines for 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 478 (2007); Green, supra note 
7, at 612; Samuel J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of
the Prosecutor’s Ethical Obligation To “Seek Justice” in a Comparative Analytical 
Framework, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2004); Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as
Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84
WASH. L. REV. 35, 61 (2009); Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors “Doing Justice” Through
Osmosis—Reminders To Encourage a Culture of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 
85 (2008). 
9. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 49. 
10. Id. at 51 n.24. 
11. Id. at 51 (“All modern codes are silent on the meaning of justice at trial.”). 
12. Id. at 52. 
13. Id. at 53.  Professor Zacharias respected prosecutors and the work they do.  In 
other articles he sought to identify both the scope and excesses of their duty to do justice 
dispassionately and accurately.  See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121 (1998).  Fred was a bit impatient with critics—including
me—who lamented the absence of professional discipline of prosecutors.  He believed
that the claim was somewhat overblown.  In another often-cited article, Professor Zacharias
examines carefully and impartially the issues surrounding bar discipline of prosecutors and




























With creativity and inspiration, Professor Zacharias sets out to provide 
concrete meaning to the amorphous concept of a prosecutor’s mandate to
promote adversarial justice.  Professor Zacharias’s principal objective
may be to encourage code drafters to take a serious look at the conduct 
of criminal trials and to clearly articulate ethical prosecutorial behavior. 
I suggest may be because I believe Fred may not have been overly
sanguine that code drafters would possess the fortitude or willingness to 
engage in this task.  More likely, Fred sought to challenge the conventional 
understanding that doing justice was entirely within the realm of
prosecutorial discretion and an obligation that prosecutors could and 
should intuit depending on the situation.
How should a prosecutor attempt to preserve the adversarial balance? 
According to Professor Zacharias, a prosecutor should intervene when
defense counsel’s performance is deficient.14  A prosecutor should not
impede defense counsel’s access to all discoverable and disclosable 
information.15  A prosecutor should intervene, or at least not remain passive, 
when the trial judge demonstrates hostility towards the defense.16  And a
prosecutor should avoid using inadmissible evidence.17  Undoubtedly, as 
Professor Zacharias well knew, each of these situations is much more
than controversial; Professor Zacharias’s proposals at a minimum reflect
outside-the-box thinking that likely would make any prosecutor—even
the most conscientious—cringe.  Indeed, reconciling these proposed 
actions with a prosecutor’s duty of “zealous advocacy” requires a mindset 
that, quite frankly, no prosecutor likely possesses.  To be sure, intervening 
when defense counsel is incompetent or the judge is biased may make
abundant sense to some prosecutors, but not with the purpose of doing 
justice.  Rather, to the conscientious prosecutor, such intervention might
be called for to preserve a likely guilty verdict from appellate reversal.
Moreover, as Professor Zacharias correctly observes, refraining from 
using inadmissible evidence is a worthy objective to preserve adversarial
balance, but often the question of admissibility is unclear, and for many 
prosecutors it is typically the judge’s call.  Also laudable for purposes of 
ensuring justice, as Professor Zacharias notes, is not impeding defense
counsel’s access to relevant information, but that objective may seem far
less pressing today when viewed in the much more common practice of
prosecutors’ conduct in deliberately suppressing relevant and truthful
absent but “[n]either has it fulfilled its commitment to maintaining the letter and spirit of
the codes.”  See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. 
L. REV. 721, 778 (2001). 
14. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 66–74. 
15. Id. at 79–85. 
16. Id. at 85–88. 
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information that is favorable to the defense and quite possibly would 
exculpate an innocent defendant. 
Fred was a romantic.  Achieving adversarial justice when the system
breaks down, as the above examples illustrate, reflects Professor Zacharias’s 
faith that the adversarial system has the capacity to correct itself and that
prosecutors have the courage and integrity to step out of their purely 
adversarial roles and ensure that justice is done.  Prosecutors, he believed,
can be encouraged to compete properly and fairly as both zealous advocates
and ministers of justice in order to establish the essential adversarial
balance.  And, if they fail or are unable to achieve that mission, then
code drafters, by enacting clear and explicit rules, can discourage
prosecutors from taking undue advantage of their built-in resources.  
Fred understood clearly that prosecutors typically make difficult 
judgment calls in broad gray areas and that telling prosecutors to act 
noncompetitively may only complicate their self-image.18  Fred also 
understood that enacting explicit ethical requirements that are widely
disobeyed may do more harm than good in fostering cynicism and
encouraging further disobedience.19  As Professor Zacharias correctly 
notes, no prosecutor has ever been disciplined for failing to do justice at
trial.20  However, attempting to make somewhat more explicit an ethical
mandate that is maddeningly vague and frustratingly amorphous has 
considerable merit; if nothing else, it teaches judges, lawyers, other 
participants in the adversary system, and the general public as well, the 
meaning of adversarial justice and what the legal profession expects of
prosecutors.  Even if the codes continue to resist giving content to the
do-justice requirement, as Fred likely expected, his seminal vision of the 
appropriate conduct of a prosecutor in striving to do justice illuminates 
the empty rhetoric in the codes and offers those who continue to be 
educated and inspired by Fred’s scholarship an honorable and dramatic
alternative. 
18. Id. at 103. 
19. See id. at 104. 
20. Id. at 105. 
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